Since the 1970s, U.S. federal courts have issued court orders condemning state prison crowding. However, the impact of these court orders on prison spending and prison conditions is theoretically ambiguous because it is unclear if these court orders are enforceable. We examine states' responses to court interventions and show that these interventions generate higher per inmate incarceration costs, lower inmate mortality rates, and a reduction in prisoners per capita. If states seek to minimize the cost of crime through deterrence, an increase in prison costs should lead states to shift resources from corrections to other means of deterring crime such as welfare and education spending. However, we find that court interventions, that are associated with higher corrections expenditures, lead to lower welfare expenditures. This suggests that the burden of increased correctional spending is borne by the poor. Furthermore, states do not increase welfare spending after their release from court order; making the reduction in welfare spending permanent. Thus, our results suggest that states do not respond to prison reform in the manner prescribed by the deterrence model. States' responses to prison reform are most consistent with the predictions in the empirical public finance literature that indicate stickiness in expenditure categories and that increases in spending in programs that affect the poor generate declines in expenditures in other program that are also targeted to the poor.
Introduction
The United States federal courts have ordered state officials to improve various dimensions of the operations of schools, prisons, and mental hospitals. However, the enforceability of these court orders is limited by the Eleventh Amendment of the U.S.
constitution which provides states with immunity in federal court.
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To get around the Eleventh Amendment, federal cases name specific state officials as defendants, rather than the state, but it is difficult to enforce court orders that require additional spending against state officials since most state constitutions forbid disbursements from the state treasury except by legislative appropriation (Hirschhorn, 1984) . If the state government is reluctant to appropriate the necessary funds to improve the quality of the services provided by an institution (such as schools or prisons) the federal court can respond by closing the institution, but judges may be unwilling to take such drastic measures. Furthermore, orders to close institutions may be reversed on appeal (Hirschhorn, 1984) . Thus, it is unclear theoretically whether federal court orders requiring additional state expenditures are enforceable.
The empirical evidence on the issue is ambiguous. For example, federal court orders that aim to improve prison conditions have received significant attention, but the extent to which these court orders increase correctional expenditures is disputed (Harriman and Straussman, 1983; Taggart, 1989; and Fliter, 1996) , although Levitt (1996) shows that these court orders reduce prison population growth. Even if such federal court orders were fully enforceable, their impact on the provision of the services targeted by the court order as well as on other services provided by the states would depend on how the states choose to finance the additional expenditures that would 1 The Eleventh Amendment states that "The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." emerge as a consequence of the court order.
A number of researchers have examined the federal court orders from a normative perspective. For example, federal court orders to reform schools, prisons, and mental institutions have been criticized as undemocratic .
Others have pointed out that the state political process gives little weight to the disadvantaged. For instance, prisoners' rights are less likely to be protected by the states since inmates are not allowed to vote. Thus, it has been argued that federal courts should be given authority over expenditures for the disadvantaged to balance out the fact that the disadvantaged have little influence in the state political process (Rose-Ackerman, 2003) .
Although the intended consequence of federal court interventions is to enforce the constitutional and statutory rights of disadvantaged groups, it is possible that an unintended consequence is the decline in funds allocated to other disadvantaged groups as a consequence of the additional expenditures that have to be incurred by the states to comply with these court orders. A related example is the case of the U.S.
Congress which can force states to spend more on groups of individuals by making it a condition to continue receiving federal grants . Baicker (2001) finds that federally-mandated increases in medicaid spending lead to increases in medicaid spending at the expense of other state welfare spending. Similarly, Baicker and Gordon (2006) examine state Supreme Courts orders to equalize spending across school districts. They find that these orders increase state aid to localities for education at the expense of aid for public welfare, health, hospitals, and general services. Thus, if federal court orders are enforceable, it is plausible that the resources used to satisfy the court order come from other disadvantaged groups.
In this paper, we examine the impact of federal court orders to improve prison conditions. Specifically, we investigate whether federal court orders did indeed im-prove prison conditions, whether they impacted state expenditures on corrections, and if and how states re-allocated resources in reaction to these court orders.
Since 1970, federal court interventions have affected such dimensions of prison operations as staffing, the amount of space per inmate, medical and mental health care, food, hygiene, sanitation, disciplinary procedures, conditions in disciplinary segregation, exercise, fire safety, inmate classification, grievance policies, race discrimination, sex discrimination, religious discrimination and accommodations, and disability discrimination and accommodations (Schlanger, 2006) . In 1995, state attorneys general successfully lobbied Congress to pass the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) so that they could regain control over prisons (Wharton, 1996) . The PLRA ended federal court supervision over several state correctional systems and made any further court intervention more difficult (Schlanger, 2006) . Sullivan (2000) reports the deterioration of Tennessee prisons after their release from federal court supervision. We find that following federal court orders, prison conditions improved, prison costs per inmate increased, and per capita spending on welfare decreased. Thus, our results suggest that federal court can increase state expenditures but that it is likely that the resources used to finance these additional expenditures come from other disadvantaged groups. Our results follow from a difference-in-differences methodology. and a large literature suggests that outlays on social welfare and education are substitutes for corrections in combating crime.
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Thus, if states seek to deter crime, we expect an increase in state spending on social welfare and/or education following federal court intervention.
Contrary to our expectation we find the court orders, which are associated with an increase in correctional spending, did not alter education spending, but generated a decrease in welfare spending. We provide two related explanations for these findings.
First, it is possible that spending in various budget categories is "sticky." Following a court order to improve prison conditions, per capita corrections expenditures go up despite the decline in inmates per capita. If states experience higher crimes rates following a short-run reduction in the prison population, it may be infeasible to maintain a lower imprisonment rate. In general it may be difficult for the state to change the long-run level of the imprisonment rate given that it is affected by the decision of so many independent parties (state legislature, police, prosecutors, judge, juries, parole boards, and probation officers). If expenditures on corrections are "sticky," corrections expenditures will remain at a higher level even after the state has had enough time to adjust. Thus, given the budget constraints faced by the state, a permanent increase in corrections expenditures would have a negative impact on the provision of all services, including welfare services. Second, policy makers may consider expenditures on various programs that affect the poor as substitutes. Given that court orders increase the cost of punishing criminals, to the extent that policy makers perceive criminals as being members of low-income groups, they may decide to decrease in welfare payments, rather than to reduce other spending items, such as transportation.
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Section 2 discusses prison litigation. Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 explains our empirical methodology and Section 5 presents the results.
Prison litigation 2.1 Background and prior research
Prior to the 1960s federal and state courts almost invariably refused to hear cases regarding prison conditions (Bleich 1989; Schlanger 1999) . In 1963, the Supreme Court held that inmates could employ the writ of habeas corpus to contest their conditions of incarceration.
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During the mid to late 1960s, courts intervened on narrow issues. For instance, the courts prohibited guards from using two torture devices on prisoners (the crank telephone and the teeter board) and "the application of any whipping to the bare skin of prisoners."
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In the 1970s, the federal courts took a much more activist stand. The prison systems in several states were ruled 5 Baicker (2001) finds that federally-mandated increases in medicaid spending lead to increases in medicaid spending at the expense of other state welfare spending. Further, she finds the effect to be larger with greater racial differences. Similarly, Baicker and Gordon (2006) examines state Supreme Courts orders to equalize spending across school districts. They find that these orders increase state aid to localities for education at the expense of aid for public welfare, health, hospitals, and general services. Court order to spend additional resources on prisons have occurred in some of the states with the greatest racial differences. Thus, if federal court orders are enforceable, it is plausible that the resources used to satisfy the court order come from other disadvantaged groups.
6 Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236 (1963) . 7 Jackson v. Bishop, E.D. Ark., 268 F. Supp. 804 (1967) .
unconstitutional, and the courts enacted sweeping remedies based on the totality of prison conditions. Federal court intervention narrowed in scope in the 1980s. As described by Fliter (1996) and Schlanger (2006) , this could be because the lawsuits in the 1970s made states more aware of legal liabilities, and many states created dispute resolution mechanisms to address grievances; and it could also be due the appointment of conservative judges to the federal bench by Republican administrations (Schlanger, 2006; Epstein et al., 2007) . Finally, in 1995 Congress passed the Prison Litigation
Reform Act which made existing court orders harder to sustain and new ones harder to obtain (Schlanger, 2006) .
Three previous studies have examined the impact of court orders on prison conditions. Harriman and Straussman (1983) , Taggart (1989) and Fliter (1996) 
Data
Following Levitt (1996), we consider a state under court order if all correctional facilities of the state came under court order. These "Litigated States" and the date in which the state's correctional system came under court order, and the date of release are displayed in Table 1 . We used the information at the Civil Rights Litigation Clearinghouse to reconcile the small discrepancies in year and litigated status among the prior studies (Taggart, 1989; Fliter, 1996; Levitt, 1996) . We also analyze 9 http://clearinghouse.wustl.edu. The correct data for when the state Alabama was released from court order is obtained from "U.S. Relinquishes Alabama Prisons; Dismissing 17-Year Lawsuit," New York Times, January 15, 1989, p. 17. 10 In 1992, more than three-quarters of the operating expenditures went to labor compensation (salaries, wages, and benefits), while the rest was devoted to the purchase of supplies, contract services, and the like. 
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The prison mortality rate is computed as prison deaths per 1,000 state prisoners. Because of data limitations, the prison mortality is not adjusted for age, gender, or race of prisoners. Data on prison population and prison deaths are obtained from Donohue and Wolfers (2005), and updated using data from the Bureau of Justice Statistics.
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We also control for real income per capita, the proportion of female-headed households, the poverty rate, state unemployment rate, percentage of the state population that is black, percentage of the state population residing in urban areas, and variables gauging the age distribution in the state. Income per capita data are obtained from the Bureau of Economic Analysis. We followed Berry, Fording and Hanson (2003) methodology to calculate the proportion of female-headed households in each state until the year 2000. We used the poverty rate data reported by the same authors for the period of 1960-1990 and the data provided by the census for the period 1980-2007 to create a consistent poverty rate series.
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The unemployment rate is defined as Government Labor Productivity: Examples from Eleven Services, U.S. Department of Labor, June 1998.) 11 In response to these conditions the court ruled that California must release tens of thousand of inmates to relive overcrowding.
12 The data can be downloaded at http://bpp.wharton.upenn.edu/jwolfers/DeathPenalty. shtml.
13 Data source is ICPSR, study number 1294.
the insured unemployment rate.
State-and-year specific age and race distribution is calculated using information from the Center for Disease Control and the Bureau of the Census. The proportion of state population residing in urban areas is calculated using census data. Regressions also include a variable gauging the ideology of the state's citizens, created by Berry et al. (1998) .
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A higher value of this index signifies more liberal ideology. 
Empirical methodology
In Figure 15 Updated values of the measure are available at (http://www.uky.edu/∼rford/ Home files/page0005.htm).
states. When the time period is zero (the year in which the court order was issued) the ratio jumps to about 87%; it reaches 102% two years after the court order and levels off. Thus, Figure 1 suggests that court intervention leads to higher corrections expenditures per inmate. An ideal strategy to identify the impact of the court orders, however, would involve randomly assigning court orders to states and observing the differences in outcomes between states that received these court orders and states that did not. In fact, the eight out of twelve litigated states are in the south and thus the assignment of court orders is far from random. In the absence of such an experiment, we follow Angrist and Lavy (2001), Ashenfelter and Card (1985) , and Freeman (1984) in assuming that while there are differences between states which received and did not receive court orders, these differences are fixed over time (after controlling for income per capita).
Furthermore, the courts do not react to short-term variations in prison conditions when imposing the court orders. Specifically, court orders are not issued in reaction to transitory deteriorations in prison conditions; rather prison litigation and court orders emerge in reaction to prison conditions that would remain dire if it were not for court intervention. The graph in Figure 1 supports this statement. There is no drop in per inmate corrections spending in litigated states relative to non-litigated states before a court order was issued.
16 Levitt (1996) provides evidence that states start responding to prison litigation before the court decision, specifically they start responding when the lawsuit is filed. The evidence in Figure 1 is consistent with this hypothesis, as corrections operating expenses per inmate increase slightly before the court order is imposed. Thus the difference in corrections expenditures per inmate before an after the court order may somewhat underestimate the effect of the court intervention.
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In this spirit, we utilize a difference-in-difference methodology to examine how states react to court intervention. In particular, we investigate the impact of court intervention on various outcomes described earlier by estimating reduced-form regressions depicted by Equation (1):
16 Put differently, there is no indication of an "Ashenfelter dip." 17 Note that corrections operating expenditures per capita in litigated states (the dashed line in Figure 1 ) remain steady in comparison to non-litigated states until one year after the court order (period 1 on the horizontal axis), while corrections operating expenditures per inmate rise sharply in the year in which the court order is handed out (period zero on the horizontal axis). This picture is consistent with the empirical result we report below, which shows that prisoners per capita in the state declines in reaction to a court order. It seems to indicate that the immediate reaction of the state to a court order is to adjust the prison population, while a budget increase in corrections spending takes a year to implement, possibly because of the fiscal cycle of the state.
where the dependent variable Y it stands for corrections expenditures (operating, or capital outlays) per prisoner, the death rate for prisoners, and prisoners per capita. The vector X it contains observable state characteristics as described in the data section above; α i stands for unobserved state characteristic and θ t represents year effects. The models also contain state-specific time trends, represented by β it , and region-period effects, represented by δ rp . The regions consist of the nine census divisions, and the periods cover the four distinct periods described in Section 2 above: before 1970 , between 1970 and 1980 , between 1980 and 1995 , and post 1995 seventy is the year of the first federal court order; 1980 is the year in which the justice department changed its policy towards prison litigation (Schlanger, 2006) ; and 1995 is the year in which Congress passed the Prison Litigation Reform Act. We also include an interaction term between the percentage of black population and the poverty rate. "CourtOrder it " is an indicator variable which takes the value of one if state i is under the court order in time t, and zero otherwise. "CourtOrder" can take the value of one only in litigated states, but there is variation in exposure to the "treatment" by a court order between litigated states; that is, in some states the court order remained effective for longer periods than others. For example, we see in Table 1 that the duration of a court order was from 1975 to 1997 in Louisiana, but it was from 1970 to 1982 in Arkansas. We include an interaction term between CourtOrder and a dummy variable which is equal to one in and after 1980 (Post 80 ) to account for the potentially different impact of court orders after 1980. We expect Post 80 × CourtOrder to decrease corrections expenditures since it has been argued that court orders had a smaller effect after the 1980s because of the narrowed scope of prison litigation in the 1980s (Fliter, 1996; Schlanger, 2006) . Because the percentage of female headed households is available until 2000, Equation (1) While the model depicted by Equation (1) analyzes the impact of a court order on the outcomes of interest, another interesting aspect is the extent to which a release from a court order influences the same outcomes. For example, while it is important to investigate whether the imposition of a court order increases prison spending and decreases spending on welfare programs, it is equally important to analyze if the effect of a release from court order is symmetric. More specifically, Equation (2) below is used to investigate the impact of a release, conditional on being under a court order:
where Release is a dichotomous variable which takes the value of one in the year during which the state was released from court order as well as in all years afterwards until the end of the sample. Thus, the variable Release captures the "treatment period" for the state, in which the "treatment" is the release from a court order. The data on the proportion of female-headed households is available until 2000, but New
Hampshire and Texas were releases from court order in 2001 and 2002, respectively.
To include these events to the analysis we ran the models without female-headed household variable, which created a sample that spans from 1972 to 2006.
Equation (2) is estimated in the sample of litigated states and in the years following the initiation of a court order. More precisely, this sample includes all state-years after a state came under the court order.
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For example, Table 1 shows that Alabama came under court order in 1975. Therefore, the sample includes the observations from Alabama in years 1975 and later. The same argument applies to the other states listed in Table 1 . Thus, Equation (2) investigates whether the release from the court order had an impact on outcomes (conditional on being under the court order). (Fliter, 1996; Schlanger, 2006) . On the other hand, the sum of η and δ is negative and significantly different from zero for inmates per capita (p=0.08), indicating that court orders had a smaller but still statistically significant impact on prison crowding after 1980. The impact of the court orders on operating expenses (column 1) is the same in pre-and post-1980 periods, indicating that court orders increased corrections operating expenditures throughout the entire period of analysis.
Results
A potential reaction of states to court orders could be for states to shift the prison population to local jails. Columns (5) and (6) of Table 3 -A display the results where per capita jail expenditures and per capita state prisoners who are held in local jails due to overcrowding are used as dependent variables. In neither case we detect a statistically significant impact of the "CourtOrder," indicating that jail populations do not change in reaction to court orders.
Given that court orders decrease prison population and improve prison conditions, as revealed by a decline in prison deaths and prison population, court orders effectively reduce deterrence.
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As described in the introduction, welfare spending may be a tool for short-term crime prevention as a substitute for other deterrence measures such as imprisonment and prison conditions. Spending on education is another potential but longer-term vehicle through which crime commission can be influenced. Therefore, we examine whether the increase in the cost of punishing criminals was associated with an increase in welfare spending or education spending. More generally, we investigate whether states re-allocate resources following the court orders. has an effect, the difference between corrections expenditures and other criminal justice expenditures are expected to get larger in states that are exposed to court orders. Thus, the difference-in-difference-in-differences estimates allow us to control for unobserved factors that are not accounted for by state fixed effects, year fixed effects, state specific time trends and region-period effects. 
Conclusion
Although it is believed that the intervention of federal courts has improved the conditions in state prisons, very little systematic analysis is available on the impact of court orders. The extent to which the federal court order are enforceable is disputed (Fliter, 1996; Taggart, 1989; Harriman and Straussman 1983) . Even if the court orders are fully enforceable, the response of states having to spend additional resources on prisons depends on numerous factors such as the level of heterogeneity in the population, the shape of the utility function of the median voter (Baicker, 2001) , the deadweight cost of taxes and subsidies (Becker and Mulligan, 2001) , and the cost of altering the provision of various government services. Therefore, theoretically, the impact of federal court orders on prison spending and prison conditions is ambiguous. We also investigate the effect of the release from a court order, and we find no evidence that when the court orders are lifted states adjust back their corrections expenditures. Similarly, prison mortality rate does not change following the release of the court order.
Because court orders make it more expensive for states to deter crime through imprisonment, one could expect states to shift towards relatively cheaper means of deterring crime. For example, given that spending on education and welfare programs are expected to negatively impact criminal activity, states could spend more on these budget items following the imposition of court orders. However, we find that following court orders, state expenditures on education, transportation, and other items remained the same, but expenditures on welfare decreased by about 8%. In addition, our results indicate that after the state has been released from court order, welfare spending is not restored. The results follow from a difference-in-differences methodology. Thus, they denote changes that arise because of the exposure to a court order relative to a group of comparison states. For instance, welfare expenditures may have increased in all states, but the increase was smaller in states that were subject to court order.
One explanation of these finding is that increases in expenditures in those programs that affect the poor trigger a decrease in expenditures in other programs that also affect the poor. For instance, if state legislators believe that welfare recipients and criminals come from the same social groups, then cutting welfare spending may be considered a substitute to imprisonment in punishing criminals by the legislators.
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